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CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS INITIATED
BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE
FDA, THE ACCARDI DOCTRINE AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF CONSISTENT
AGENCY TREATMENT*
JOSEPH T SMALL, Jr.**
ROBERT A. BURGOYNE***
On November 5, 1986, a federal grand jury in Brooklyn, New
York, returned a 470-count indictment against Beech-Nut Nutrition
Corporation ("Beech-Nut"), the nation's second-largest manufac-
turer of baby food products, on charges of marketing adulterated
and misbranded apple juice for babies.' Also named as defendants
in the indictment were Beech-Nut's president and chief executive
officer, its vice president, and four other individuals. The indict-
ment resulted from an investigation by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA") which apparently convinced FDA officials to refer
the matter to the United States Attorney's Office for criminal
prosecution.
The Beech-Nut case illustrates the important and often over-
looked role that administrative agencies play in the criminal en-
forcement of federal statutes. 2 The FDA is one of numerous federal
* The authors thank Martha Ellett, Kate Sigman, Sally Paxton, Roberta Posin,
Marion Kovach and Mary Sparks for their assistance in preparing this Article. The views
expressed in the Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
position of Fulbright &Jaworski or any of its clients.
** Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, Washington, D.C.; J.D., University of Virginia
School of Law, 1975; B.A., Washington and Lee University, 1969.
*** Associate, Fulbright &Jaworski, Washington, D.C.; J.D., University of North Car-
olina School of Law, 1982; B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1978.
1 Washington Post, Nov. 6, 1986, at B9, col. 1. The indictment included one con-
spiracy count, 20 counts alleging mail fraud and 449 counts alleging violations of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2 The principles discussed herein, however, do not necessarily apply to the Beech-
Nut case. The authors have cited Beech-Nut merely as a recent and highly publicized
example of the critical role that administrative agencies often play in the criminal en-
forcement of federal laws. On the other hand, news reports suggest that Beech-Nut
might argue that it did not know that its apple juice was adulterated and misbranded.
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agencies that has the authority to recommend criminal prosecution
for violations of the statutes and regulations that it administers.
3
This Article discusses the procedural and substantive legal issues
that arise when companies and individuals are so prosecuted. 4 For
illustrative purposes, this Article refers to a hypothetical situation in
which the FDA is considering criminal prosecution of a corporate
officer in a routine case, even though the officer has received no
prior warnings from the FDA regarding the specific violations for
which prosecution is being considered. "Routine" cases are those
cases which do not involve a "health hazard, fraud or extremely
gross violations." 5 Such a prosecution would be inconsistent with
the FDA's policy of not recommending criminal prosecution in rou-
tine cases unless a party has first been given a warning and an op-
portunity to remedy the alleged violation. 6
This Article also considers the applicability of the limitations
imposed upon agencies by the so-called Accardi doctrine 7 and by the
separate but related requirement of consistent treatment of regu-
Lack of knowledge, in and of itself, is no defense to an alleged violation of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For
reasons stated in this Article, however, Beech-Nut and its corporate officials might be
able to raise the related, but distinct, defense of lack of prior notice. It is to this extent
that this Article is relevant to the Beech-Nut case.
3 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)-(d) (1982)(Federal Election Commission); 15 U.S.C.
§ 68h, 69i(b) (1982)(Federal Trade Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b), 78u(d) (1982)(Se-
curities and Exchange Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 717s(a) (1982)(Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission). Absent a statutory provision to the contrary, a referral from the
appropriate federal agency is not a prerequisite to prosecution by the Department of
Justice. See United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274, 281 (191 1)("[Iff, for any reason, the
executive department failed to report violations of [the Pure Food and Drug Act], its
neglect would leave untouched the duty of the district attorney to prosecute 'all delin-
quents for crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States.' ");
United States v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 701, 638 F.2d 1161, 1163
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980); United States v. Tonry, 433 F. Supp.
620, 622-23 (E.D. La. 1977).
4 Other articles of related interest include: Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A
Primer For Corporate Counsel, 40 Bus. LAw. 129 (1984); Frase, The Decision to File Federal
Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CH. L. REV. 246
(1980); McConachie, The Role of the Department ofJustice in Enforcing the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 31 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 333 (1976); Morris, Environmental Problems and
the Use of Criminal Sanctions, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 421 (1972); Rabin, Agency Criminal
Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV.
1036 (1972); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1307-11 (1979)[hereinafter cited as
Corporate Crime]; Wheeler, Potentialfor Criminal Liability of Personnel Under Federal Acts, Nat'l
L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 22. See also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARYJUSTIcE (1969).
5 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 80-131 and accompanying text.
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lated entities by agencies.8 It is argued that both limitations should
apply with full force to agency decisions involving criminal prosecu-
tions. When criminal sanctions are a possibility, courts should be
particularly vigorous in ensuring that agencies do not exercise their
discretionary authority in an arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent
manner.
I. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS INITIATED BY THE FDA
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("the Act") 9 authorizes the
criminal prosecution of corporations and corporate individuals who
perform certain "prohibited acts."' 0  It is not, however, "a
mandatory statute that requires the FDA to prosecute all violations
of the Act. . . . [T]he FDA clearly has significant discretion to
choose which alleged violations of the Act to prosecute."" The
"Act charges the Secretary only with recommending prosecution;
any criminal prosecution must be instituted by the Attorney Gen-
eral. The Act's enforcement provisions thus commit complete dis-
cretion to the [agency] to decide how and when they should be
exercised.' 12 Such "significant" and "complete" discretion creates
8 See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
9 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10 Id. §§ 331, 333. With limited exceptions, see id. at § 333(c)-(d), the Act is a "strict
liability" statute as "knowledge or intent [are] not required to be proved in prosecutions
under its criminal provisions .... United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670 (1975).
"[B]ut the Act, in its criminal aspect, does not require that which is objectively impossi-
ble." Id. at 673. To be held criminally liable, a person must have had "a responsible
share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws, namely, to put into
the stream of interstate commerce adulterated or misbranded drugs." United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). Moreover, "[t]he theory upon which responsi-
ble corporate agents are held criminally accountable for 'causing' violations of the Act
permits a claim that a defendant was 'powerless' to prevent or correct the violation to
'be raised defensively at a trial on the merits.'" Park, 421 U.S. at 673 (quoting United
States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964)).
11 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 842 (1985)(Marshall,J., concurring). The Court
held in Chaney that the FDA's "decision not to take enforcement action" was "immune
fromjudicial review." Id. at 832 (emphasis added). See infra notes 37-43, 117-25 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Chaney.
12 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 835. See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,
106 S. Ct. 3229, 3244-45 (1986)(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the "enforcement
scheme established by the FDCA"); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. I (1970)(discuss-
ing issues raised by the simultaneous pursuit of civil and criminal actions by the FDA).
The relevant decision-making chain for criminal enforcement actions under the Act is as
follows:
First, an inspector completes an establishment inspection report ("EIR").
Second, the inspector's supervisor in the district office [initiates] the recom-
mendation process for bringing action against the firm.
Third, the district compliance officer (who supervises enforcement case selec-
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the strong possibility for abuse and inconsistency,1 3 and, accord-
ingly, the need for rigorous and effective judicial controls exists.
This Article considers possible legal impediments 14 to criminal
tion and follow-up actions) must give approval after a review of the recommenda-
tion ....
Fourth, the district director must approve the recommended action (for prose-
cutions . . . approval of the regional food and drug director is also needed).
Fifth, the bureau responsible for the product category receives the report in its
compliance unit and... weed[s] out insufficient field recommendations, returning
some for further development.
Sixth, the regulatory management staff of the Associate Commissioner for Reg-
ulatory Affairs ... reviews [the recommendation] for appropriateness in the use of
legal resources.
Seventh, the recommendation goes to the Deputy Chief Counsel for litigation
in the office of Chief General Counsel.
Eighth, in criminal cases, the commissioner's office may review the prosecution
under general oversight responsibilities.
Ninth, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, Consumer Affairs Section,
reviews criminal ... cases.
Finally, the United States Attorney for the local area in which the violative
goods or persons are located is requested to bring the case to court.
I J. O'REILLY, FoOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 2.04 at 2-9 to 2-10 (1979). "[T]he
Justice Department has terminated approximately one-quarter of referred prosecution
cases during recent years." Id. § 8.04 at 8-18 (citing Hoffman, Enforcement Trends Under
the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act-A View from the Outside, 31 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
338 (1976)). See also United States v. Gel Spice Inc., 773 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir.
1985)(describing FDA's decision-making chain for referring cases to a U.S. Attorney),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 804 (1986).
13 See Corporate Crime, supra note 4, at 1308-11 (noting the "disparity of treatment"
and "arbitrariness" that often results from the broad discretion given in agencies).
14 The legal impediments are to be distinguished from the factual arguments that
counsel should make at all review levels, including review by the United States Attorney.
See generally W. Lockhart, Report on the Exercise of Discretion in Prosecution of Viola-
tions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Oct. 10, 1975)(unpublished first draft of a
report submitted to the Administrative Conference of the United States). The Report
notes that in 1972 an average of seven or more months expired between the FDA's
inspection and the referral of a case to the United States Attorney. Id. at 35. Professor
Lockhart criticizes the prosecution process at length because of the inconsistent and
conflicting policies that exist among and within the FDA, the Consumer Affairs Section
of the Department ofJustice, and the United States Attorney's Office. He also discusses
numerous factual considerations that, at one or more stages, have entered into decisions
not to prosecute. See, e.g., id. at 60, 150 (non-prosecution of the individuals who are less
responsible for the actions undergoing review); id. at 71-73 (non-prosecution of individ-
uals who "have left the company or been demoted to less responsible positions subse-
quent to the violations"); id. at 75 (non-prosecution of individuals because of "poor
health" or because they were "civic leader[s] of some prominence").
It is difficult to ascertain whether the lack of coordination and the inconsistent poli-
cies in the criminal enforcement of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act are representative
of criminal enforcement at the federal level. At the very least, federal officials have made
a concerted effort to provide standards, guidance and consistency in the criminal prose-
cution of bank officials. On April 2, 1985, Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, an-
nounced "the signing of an agreement between the Department ofJustice, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and four federal banking regulatory agencies designed to im-
prove the detection, investigation, and prosecution of bank fraud cases, particularly
those involving criminal misconduct on the part of bank officers." Department of'Justice
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prosecution in routine cases in which a corporate or individual de-
fendant has not first been warned of the alleged violations and given
an opportunity to take remedial actions.' 5 There are at least two
reasons why criminal prosecution may be inappropriate in this situa-
tion.1 6 First, prosecution might violate the Accardi doctrine, which
posits that "[a]n agency of the government must scrupulously ob-
serve rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established."'
17
News Release, Apr. 2, 1985, at 1. A "principal objective" of this agreement was to pro-
vide "uniform referral procedures both for routine and significant cases," including the
use of "a standard referral 'form for all four agencies." Id. at 3. The four signatory
agencies were: the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id. at 1. See
also U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, UNrrED STATES ATrORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-40.539 (1985)("Pol-
icy Concerning Prosecution" of bank bribery and bank fraud cases); Criminal Law Enforce-
ment Against Bank Officials: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary
Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
15 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. The FDA's prior-warning policy is dis-
tinct from the "Section 305" hearing that the Act requires the FDA to provide. Section
305 states that "[b]efore any violation.., is reported by the Secretary to any United
States attorney for institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such
proceeding is contemplated shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to
present his views, either orally or in writing, with regard to the contemplated proceed-
ing." 21 U.S.C. § 335. Despite the existence of this provision, the Supreme Court has
held that a Section 305 hearing "is not a prerequisite to prosecution." Dotterweich, 320
U.S. at 279. See also United States v.J. Treffiletti & Sons, 496 F. Supp. 53, 56 (N.D.N.Y.
1980).
16 Additional legal arguments may be available in a given case. For example, an indi-
vidual defendant may be able to argue that he did not hold a "responsible relation" to
the alleged violation. See Park, 421 U.S. at 670-76; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281-85;
United States v. Torgian Laboratories, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1514, 1530-31 (E.D.N.Y.)
(president convicted because "he was the individual ... who had overall and ultimate
responsibility for all.., operations" and "the responsibility and authority to implement
measures to insure that contamination of [contact] lenses sterilized by the corporation
did not occur"), aff'd mer., 751 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. New England
Grocers Supply Co., 488 F. Supp. 230, 233 (D. Mass. 1980)(reversing a magistrate's
conviction of a corporation's president because "the magistrate applied the wrong legal
standard.., finding him guilty solely by reason of his position as president"); see also
FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL pt. 8-50-20, at 15, 16 (1984)(instructing district
compliance officers that, in recommending prosecution, "[ilt is not sufficient to state
that the individual is president of the corporation and . . .[is] therefore responsible.
Include facts which tend to show his power or authority to, or to have others, do such
things as: make capital investments; repairs, etc., hire or fire officers, employees, consul-
tants, etc., and assign or change duties and responsibilities within the organization"). A
second possible defense is the "impossibility" defense, suggested in Park and recog-
nized by the lower courts. See Park, 421 U.S. at 673; Gel Spice Inc., 773 F.2d at 434-35;
United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 511-12 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512, 515 (9th Cir. 1976). The
impossibility defense requires a defendant to show that, despite the exercise of "ex-
traordinary care," he was unable to prevent violations of the Act. New England Grocers,
433 F. Supp. at 234.
17 United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir. 1976)(interpreting Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)). When an agency fails to follow its own rules,
1987]
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Second, a decision by the FDA in a routine case to recommend the
prosecution of a defendant who has not first been warned and given
an opportunity to act would be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of
discretion because the FDA typically has not recommended prose-
cution of similarly situated parties in the past. This latter argument
parallels the identical FDA policy that supports the Accardi argu-
ment. It is, however, a distinct argument which is grounded in the
well-established principle that "[platently inconsistent application
of agency standards to similar situations lacks rationality and is arbi-
trary" action prohibited under the arbitrary and capricious standard
of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 18
Apart from the Accardi argument, which some courts say is
based upon due process principles, constitutional challenges on
either due process or equal protection grounds may also be avail-
able. These challenges, however, are not likely to succeed. As dis-
cussed below, no constitutional rights are implicated unless a
United States Attorney decides to prosecute. The United States At-
torney's Office has almost limitless discretion with regard to prose-
cution decisions.' 9 Most cases, therefore, present neither the
compelling facts nor the necessary legal predicates to invalidate a
decision to prosecute on constitutional grounds.
II. THE FDA's PRIOR-WARNING POLICY
In most cases, the FDA sends a "regulatory" letter,20 an "infor-
mation" letter or some other type of warning to a company or indi-
vidual regarding suspected violations.2 1 These letters implement
regulations or procedures, "its action cannot stand and courts will strike it down." Id.
The precise underpinnings of the Accardi doctrine are unclear. See infra note 83.
18 Contractors Transport Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir.
1976).
19 See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
20 "A regulatory letter is a blunt warning about alleged violations of the... Act, sent
by the [FDA's] field or headquarters offices to firms or individuals thought to be respon-
sible for the violation. The letters, officially called 'notices of adverse findings,' gener-
ally are sent following an unsatisfactory inspection .... " I J. O'REILLY, SUpra note 12,
6.02 at 6-4 through 6-5. See also FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURE MANUAL pt. 8-10-20, at 2
("[regulatory] letters ... are used primarily to effect prompt correction. They are also a
way of providing prior warning and notice to responsible officials of possible civil or
criminal actions").
21 Potential defendants should consider filing a Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") request to fill any gaps in the FDA's interaction with a particular company or
individual. In particular, potential defendants should attempt to obtain copies of all
regulatory and information letters and a copy of the company Compliance Profile Rec-
ord. The Compliance Profile Record is located at the FDA's district office and lists the
firm's history of inspections and regulatory actions. The FDA, however, may refuse to
release these materials because of the on-going investigation and enforcement proceed-
PROSECUTIONS INITIATED BY THE FDA
the FDA's stated policy of giving warnings prior to instituting en-
forcement actions in routine cases. This policy is set forth in nu-
merous provisions of the FDA's Regulatory Procedures Manual,
22
including:
When it is consistent with the public interest, it is FDA's policy to ad-
vise regulated firms of potentially violative products, practices or con-
ditions, or of violations requiring correction; and to give firms an
opportunity to make corrections voluntarily prior to initiating legal or
administrative action.
23
Except in cases involving a health hazard, fraud or extremely gross
violations, prior warning must have been given to the firm and each
individual involved [before a Section 305 Notice is issued]. This prior
warning may be in the form of conferences, previous meetings, letters
or previous court actions. In instances where the prior warning was in
the form of letters or [a] Section 305 Notice involving past violations,
copies must have been directed to each individual to be cited.
24
ings. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.64 (1986) (specific exemption in FDA's FOIA provisions for "in-
vestigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes").
22 Such a policy should not affect the relevant legal analysis under applicable prece-
dent, see, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 234-35 (1974); Massachusetts Fair Share v.
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 758 F.2d 708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1985), as
these policy statements are not formal rules or regulations produced by rule-making or
adjudication. Cf 21 C.F.R. pt. 7 (1986) (entitled "Enforcement Policy," referencing its
purpose of "assur[ing] uniform and consistent application of practices and procedures
throughout the agency," id. at 7.1; it does not, however, address the prior-warning pol-
icy). Instead, the policy statements probably would be viewed by a court as informal
guidelines for inspectors or other FDA employees. According to the FDA, formal
"guidelines" state procedures or standards of general applicability that are not legal
requirements but are acceptable to FDA for a subject matter which falls within the laws
administered by the Commissioner." Id. at 10.90(b)(1). In this regard, "[tihe Commis-
sioner advises that guidelines in staff manuals are not formal 'guidelines' unless there
has been compliance with the requirements of [section 10.90.]" 42 Fed. Reg. 4694
(1977). It is not clear whether the guidelines discussed in this Article satisfy those re-
quirements. But see IJ. O'REILLY, supra note 12, § 4.07, at 4-35 (informal guidelines are
contained, inter alia, in internal manuals that "are available to the public, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(2), but are not binding on the FDA"). The FDA and the United States Attor-
neys almost certainly will argue that the policy statements are internal policy statements
that do not bind the FDA and do not create substantive tights in regulated parties. Sup-
port for this position is found in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979),
Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981), and Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co.,
796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See discussion infra at notes 107-16 and accompanying
text.
23 FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL pt. 8-10-20, at 2. Note, however, that this
provision also specifically states that "[s]ince FDA is under no legal obligation to warn
firms or individuals that they or their products are in violation of the law before initiat-
ing formal regulatory action, responsible individuals should not assume that they will
receive a Notice of Adverse Findings or Regulatory Letter before FDA initiated an ad-
ministrative action or recommends an injunction, seizure, civil penalty and/or criminal
proceeding." Id. pt. 8-10-20, at 1.
24 Id. pt. 8-30-30, at 2. A "Section 305 Notice" informs a company or individual that
the FDA has discovered apparent violations of the Act. A "Section 305 Hearing" is then
19871
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[In determining the need for a Section 305 citation], the [District
Compliance Branch] reviewing officer should study the firm's regula-
tory history and determine who was responsible for violations and
whether prior warning had been given.
25
In routine cases, it is incumbent upon the [field] office issuing the Sec-
tion 305 Notice to assure that the firm and each individual to be cited
has received prior warning, unless such warning is not required.
26
The question of citing individuals is a most important one which calls
for careful consideration in every case. Bear in mind that prior warn-
ing is a prerequisite in all [cases] but [those involving] danger to
health, fraud, and gross violations.
27
With the exception of cases involving gross violations, fraud, or dan-
ger to health, each prosecution must ordinarily contain counts which
show a continuous course of conduct. This may consist of counts from
two inspections, or counts from separate violative shipments at differ-
ent points in time. This is because, except in aggravated circum-
stances, the agency ordinarily exercises its prosecutorial discretion to
seek criminal sanctions against an individual only where a prior warn-
ing or other notification to the individual can be shown. The normal
procedure of establishing a background of warning or other notifica-
tion before prosecution will demonstrate to the U.S. Attorney, the
judge, and the jury that there has been a continuous course of violative
conduct and a failure to effect correction. Bear in mind that failure to
correct a violative situation after notification will result in prosecution
on thefirst incident as well as on subsequent incidents.
2 8
Except in cases of gross violations, fraud, or danger to health, prior
warnings must ordinarily be shown for each individual charged, as dis-
cussed [above].
29
held to give that company or individual an opportunity to present their views before the
FDA refers the case for criminal prosecution. See Gel Spice Inc., 773 F.2d at 430. Again,
the Section 305 notice and hearing are distinct from the FDA's prior-warning policy. See
supra note 7.
25 FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL pt. 8-30-40, at 3.
26 Id. pt. 8-30-50, at 4.
27 Id. pt. 8-30-50, at 5.
28 Id. pt. 8-50-10, at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
29 Id. pt. 8-50-20, at 16 ("Format for Recommendation" of prosecution by District
Compliance Branch). See also Fine, The Philosophy of Enforcement, 31 FOOD DRUG COSM.
LJ. 324, 329 (1976) ("The law allows the FDA to charge individuals who have no knowl-
edge of a violation, if they hold a responsible position and, by virtue of the position held,
should have known of the violative condition.... We insist, however, that our prosecution
recommendations include a factual record which demonstrates that every individual
charged either knew or should have known of the violative conditions set forth, and was
in a position to do something about those conditions but failed to do so." (emphasis in
original)). Mr. Fine was the FDA's Associate Commissioner for Compliance when he
wrote The Philosophy of Enforcement. Id. at 324.
[Vol. 78
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Consistent with the FDA's prior-warning policy, a less-noted is-
sue in United States v. Park was "the admissibility of evidence demon-
strating that [Park, President of the corporation] was advised by the
FDA in 1970 of insanitary conditions in [his company's] Philadelphia
warehouse."30 The Court upheld the admissibility of the evidence,
stating that it "demonstrate[d] that [Park] was on notice that he
could not rely on his system of delegation to subordinates ... and
that he must have been aware of the deficiencies of his system
before the ... violations were discovered."'
III. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE FDA's PRIOR-WARNING POLICY
The involvement of administrative agencies in the criminal en-
forcement of federal statutes raises procedural and substantive legal
issues rarely addressed by the parties in a given case or by the
courts. The following discussion examines these issues. This Arti-
cle suggests that the administrative law/criminal law overlap arising
from such enforcement implicates substantial legal rights of poten-
tial defendants and that these rights should be vigorously protected
by the courts. This protection is particularly crucial in the context
of criminal enforcement of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act be-
cause that Act is essentially a strict liability statute.
3 2
A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES: THRESHOLD REVIEWABILITY PROBLEMS
The question of reviewability is a threshold procedural issue for
parties considering a challenge to a criminal prosecution initiated by
the FDA. Although in-depth treatment is beyond the scope of this
Article, the issue is important because pre-indictment review should
not be relied upon automatically.
1. Pre-enforcement Judicial Review
Pre-enforcement/pre-indictment judicial review of a FDA deci-
sion to recommend criminal prosecution will rarely be available.
33
30 421 U.S. at 676.
3' Id. at 677-78. See Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85
YALE L.J. 1091, 1115-20 (1976)(discussing the FDA's prior warnings to Park and the
significance of these warnings). See also United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 505 F.2d
565, 573 (4th Cir. 1974)(only those individuals who "share in the responsibility of dis-
tributing adulterated or misbranded drugs" are subject to criminal liability;
"'[r]esponsibility' in turn depends upon knowledge, and if knowledge is established it
depends further on the action or nonaction of the officer or employee after he has ob-
tained knowledge"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
32 See supra note 10. See also Triangle Candy Co. v. United States, 144 F.2d 195, 199
(9th Cir. 1944).
33 The general question ofjudicial review of and deference to agency action has been
1987]
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In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselbeny, Inc.,34 the Supreme Court held
that a district court "had no jurisdiction to review the [FDA's] deter-
mination of probable cause" to support a seizure of misbranded ar-
ticles because the determination "in and of itself had no binding
legal consequence. ' 3 5 The Court's reasoning fully applies to a pre-
enforcement challenge to a FDA recommendation that a company
or individual be prosecuted. The Court stated:
Here an administrative agency is merely determining whether a judi-
cial proceeding should be instituted. Moreover, its findings of prob-
able cause, while a necessary prerequisite to multiple seizures, has no
effect in and of itself. All proceedings for the enforcement of the Act
or to restrain violations of it must be brought by and in the name of
the United States .... Whether a suit will be instituted depends on
the Attorney General, not on the administrative agency. He may or
may not accept the agency's recommendation. If he does, seizures are
made and libels are instituted. But the seizures and suits are depen-
dent on the discretion of the Attorney General.
36
A second relevant case in this regard is Heckler v. Chaney, in
which the Supreme Court in 1985 held that "a decision of an admin-
istrative agency to exercise its 'discretion' not to undertake certain
enforcement actions is [presumptively not] subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act. ' 3 7 In Chaney, several
prison inmates sought relief from the FDA arguing that the use of
addressed at length by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition
Institute, 106 S. Ct. 2360, 2364-66 (1986)(upholding the FDA's interpretation of ambig-
uous statutory provisions); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)(upholding the EPA's interpretation of statutory provision).
34 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
35 Id. at 600.
36 Id. at 598-99. See also National Milk Producers Federation v. Harris, 653 F.2d 339,
344 (8th Cir. 1981); Southeastern Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758, 763-64 (5th
Cir. 1980)("The district court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by enjoining the [FDA]
from interfering with the manufacturing and marketing of appellee's premix product
.... [T]he appellees ... sought pre-enforcement review of the FDA's determination
that probable cause existed to seize and to initiate enforcement proceedings against the
... product, a review dearly proscribed by Ewing."); Parke-Davis & Co. v. Califano, 564
F.2d 1200, 1205 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); 21 C.F.R.
§ 10.45(d)(2)(i) (1986)("[t]he [FDA] Commissioner shall object to judicial review.., if
... [a] matter is committed by law to the discretion of the Commissioner, e.g., a decision
to recommend or not to recommend civil or criminal enforcement"). Cf. Georator
Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 767-68 (4th Cir. 1979) (district court lacks jurisdiction to
review the EEOC's "determination of reasonable cause on the charge of discrimination"
because the determination "is merely preparatory to further proceedings" and "[n]o...
finality exists").
37 470 U.S. at 823 (citation omitted). See also Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d
683 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Chaney precludes judicial review of a settlement agreement under
which the FDA agreed not to pursue enforcement actions against a company). The
Supreme Court made clear in Chaney that its holding was limited to judicial review under
the APA. 470 U.S. at 837-38. Therefore, Chaney does not preclude review of a FDA
PROSECUTIONS INITIATED BY THE FDA
drug injections to carry out death penalties violated the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act. The inmates petitioned the FDA to "take various
investigatory and enforcement actions to prevent these perceived vi-
olations [including] recommend[ing] the prosecution of all those in
the chain of distribution who knowingly distribute or purchase
drugs with intent to use them for human execution."38 When the
FDA refused to act, the inmates relied upon the APA to seek judicial
review of the agency's refusal to initiate any such enforcement
actions.
By holding that a FDA decision "not to exercise its enforcement
authority"39 is "not subject to review under the APA," 40 the Court
distinguished such non-action from those instances in which "an
agency does act to enforce." 4' This language arguably supports the
conclusion that a FDA criminal referral is subject to judicial re-
view.42 The overall tenor of the Court's decision is to the contrary,
however, and, in support, the Court specifically cited the FDA regu-
lation which states that the Agency "'shall object to judicial review
... if... [t]he matter is committed by the law to the discretion of the
Commissioner, e.g., a decision to recommend or not to recommend
civil or criminal enforcement action .... " ,,43 Thus, although Chaney
is relevant to this discussion, its import remains unclear.
In light of Ewing and Chaney, a party has little chance of success-
fully challenging at the pre-indictment stage a decision by the FDA
to refer a case for criminal prosecution.44 The FDA is required by
its regulations to oppose such judicial review,45 and the precedents
indicate that the courts would most likely uphold the FDA's
enforcement action or inaction that is alleged to be unconstitutional. See generally Sun-
stein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985).
38 Chancy, 470 U.S. at 824.
39 Id. at 828 (emphasis in original).
40 Id. at 838.
41 Id. at 832 (emphasis in original).
42 See Heterochemical Corp. v. FDA, 644 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)(applying this
distinction in a non-criminal action to reject the FDA's argument of non-reviewabil-
ity)(emphasis added).
43 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 836 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 10.45(d)(2) (1984)).
44 Cases that have allowed pre-enforcement review of FDA actions are easily distin-
guished from the case in which a single individual or company has allegedly violated the
Act's provisions. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)(pre-
enforcement review of an industry-wide FDA labeling regulation). In Abbott, the Court
specifically distinguished Ewing as a "proceeding against a particular drug manufac-
turer," rather than an agency "promulgation of a self- operative industry-wide regula-
tion." Id. at 137. The Court added that the Ewing decision "was quite clearly correct"
and that, "like a determination by a grand jury that there is probable cause to proceed
against an accused, [the FDA's probable cause] finding... only has vitality once a pro-
ceeding is commenced, at which time appropriate challenges can be made." Id. at 147.




2. Post-enforcement Judicial Review
There are two post-enforcement/post-indictment reviewability
dilemmas. Unlike the pre-enforcement problem, these issues do not
involve the actual unavailability of judicial review. Instead, they in-
volve the problem of extreme judicial deference that, in effect, ordi-
narily results in a total lack of judicial review. Two problems arise
because this deference operates at two levels: (1) the FDA may de-
cide to pursue criminal prosecution, rather than pursuing alterna-
tive sanctions, and (2) the executive branch-initially the FDA and
subsequently the United States Attorney-may decide to prosecute.
In Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co.,47 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the proposition that an agency's choice of sanctions may
not be overturned unless it is "unwarranted in law or... without
justification in fact .... -48 The Court rejected the argument that an
administrative sanction is "rendered invalid in a particular case be-
cause it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases." 49
The Court's reasoning in this regard could be used to refute an ar-
gument that a decision to recommend prosecution in the face of
non-prosecution of similarly situated persons is arbitrary and capri-
cious.50 The Court stated:
We read the Court of Appeals' opinion to suggest that the sanction
was "unwarranted in law" because "uniformity of sanctions for similar
violations" is somehow mandated by the [Packers and Stockyards] Act.
We search in vain for that requirement in the statute .... [M]ere un-
evenness in the application of the sanction does not render its applica-
tion in a particular case "unwarranted in law." 51
In light of Butz, therefore, it is safe to conclude that the choice
of prosecution as the appropriate sanction, if it is reviewable at all, is
subject to extreme judicial deference. 52 Furthermore, "mere un-
46 Moreover, even ifjudicial review were afforded, courts would almost always defer
to the FDA's decision. "As long as the agency is choosing how to allocate finite enforce-
ment resources, the agency's choice will be entitled to substantial deference, for the
choice among valid alternative enforcement policies is precisely the sort of choice over
which agencies generally have been left substantial discretion by their enabling stat-
utes." Chaney, 470 U.S. at 842 (Marshall, J., concurring).
47 411 U.S. 182 (1973).
48 Id. at 185-86 (quoting American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112-13
(1946)).
49 Id. at 187.
50 See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
51 Butz, 411 U.S. at 186, 188.
52 See, e.g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112-13 (1946); Wayne
Cusimano, Inc. v. Block, 692 F.2d 1025, 1030 (5th Cir. 1982); Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967)("The breadth of agency discretion is,
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evenness in the application of th[at] sanction," if it exists, does not
render the sanction's application to a company or individual unwar-
ranted in law.
53
A second post-enforcement reviewability problem involves the
extreme judicial deference afforded a decision by the executive
branch to prosecute. "Our legal system has traditionally accorded
wide discretion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement process,
and similar considerations have been found applicable to adminis-
trative prosecutors as well."' 54 Only in cases involving egregious
conduct or constitutional violations55 will courts disturb a prosecu-
tor's exercise of discretion. 56 If a party challenges a decision by the
if anything, at [a] zenith when the action assailed relates primarily not to the issue of
ascertaining whether conduct violates the statute ... but rather to the fashioning of
policies, remedies and sanctions.").
53 Butz, 411 U.S. at 188. See, e.g., Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411
(1958)(FTC's decision to order one company to cease and desist from certain practices
without likewise requiring other companies engaged in the same practices to do so could
not be overturned "in the absence of a patent abuse of discretion"); Villela v. Dep't of
the Air Force, 727 F.2d 1574, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1984)("[t]he choice of penalty is gener-
ally left to agency discretion .... That Villela was removed [from the Air Force] and
[two others who also went AWOL] were reprimanded provides no basis for reversal. An
agency need not exercise its discretion identically in every case"); Sartain v. SEC, 601
F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979)(imposition of sanction "not rendered invalid in particu-
lar case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases").
54 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980)(citations omitted). See also
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979)("[w]hether to prosecute and what
charge to file ... are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion"). See
generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 9 (2d ed. 1979 & 1982 Supp.);
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
55 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978)("broad though [a pros-
ecuting attorney's] discretion may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon
its exercise"); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Velsicol Chemical Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255, 1256-57 (D.D.C. 1980)(dismissing an in-
dictment on due process grounds because of "prosecutorial vindictiveness" where the
prosecutor acted upon his threat to increase the charges against a corporation and vari-
ous individuals to include a charge of conspiring to defraud the FDA if they plead nolo
contendere to misdemeanor FDA adulteration charges).
56 Indeed, many courts have held that the decision whether to prosecute is wholly
unreviewable in part because of the separation of powers doctrine. E.g., United States v.
Kysar, 459 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1972)(the United States Attorney "has the power to
prosecute or not to prosecute; this decision is not reviewable by any court"); Newman v.
United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967)("United States Attorney consent to guilty
plea tendered by codefendant, for lesser offense, while refusing to grant same plea for
the defendant was not constitutional violation"); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167,
171 (5th Cir.)("as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers ... the courts
are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of
the United States and their control over criminal prosecutions"), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965); Anderson v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 349 F. Supp. 121, 122 (W.D. Va.
1972)("within United States Attorney's discretion to prosecute possible statutory viola-
tions"). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)("the Executive Branch.
has exclusive and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case") (dictum).
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United States Attorney to prosecute, that party will have to over-
come the formidable body of precedent that largely shields such de-
cisions from judicial review.
57
Similarly, a challenge to the FDA's decision to recommend
prosecution, if it is reviewable at all, would encounter the many
cases that give extreme deference to the prosecutorial decisions of
administrative agencies. In Pseudonym Taxpayer v. Miller, for example,
the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to restrain the
IRS from recommending to the United States Attorney that a tax-
payer be criminally prosecuted:
[I]t is not a judicial function to poke about in the discretionary opera-
tions of an agency in the Executive Branch .... There are well-estab-
lished statutes and regulations, and no indication that any
constitutional or statutory right is being invoked. I.R.S. has primary
jurisdiction to decide whether to recommend and whether to refer for
prosecution. This is strictly a discretionary Executive Branch function
in which the judiciary should not interfere.58
This reasoning applies equally to a prosecution recommendation by
the FDA.
Recent cases, however, suggest a shift in this view. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838-39 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); id. at 845-50 (Marshall, J., concurring); K. DAvis, supra note 54,
§ 9.6, at 239-40 ("The key to understanding the law of reviewability of enforcement
discretion does not lie in... reconcil[ing] the irreconcilable cases [but] ... in recogniz-
ing that the law has been in transition and that case law since 1974 is strongly on the side
of reviewability.").
57 See cases cited supra note 56. See also United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255,
1257 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358, 361 (lth Cir. 1983)(per
curiam); United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 942 (1983); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984); United States v. Valle, 697 F.2d 152, 154 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 918
(1983).
58 Pseudonym Taxpayer v. Miller, 497 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D.NJ. 1980). See supra note
46. See also Groder v. United States, No. 86-2054, slip op. at 8 (4th Cir. April 9,
1987)("We emphasize at the outset that the individual revenue agent and his supervisor
enjoy latitude in making the difficult [criminal] referral decision. They also deserve def-
erence from a reviewing court."); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533,
538 (D.C. Cir. 1986)("an agency's exercise of its enforcement discretion [is] an area in
which the courts have traditionally been most reluctant to interfere"); Presinzano v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 726 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1984); National Milk Producers Federa-
tion, 653 F.2d at 343, 344 n.1 1 ("[tlhe executive branch and its departments enjoy a
discretion in the initiation of investigative, enforcement, and prosecutorial actions lim-
ited only by constitutional strictures and relevant statutory directives"); Gordon v. Hei-
mann, 514 F. Supp. 659, 662 (N.D. Ga. 1980)("[t]he decision by the Comptroller [of the
Currency] to investigate or bring criminal charges in a specific case is an enforcement
decision not reviewable by the court").
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B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE
REQUIREMENT OF CONSISTENT AGENCY TREATMENT AND THE
ACCAIRDI DOCTRINE
Assuming that a party can overcome the considerable hurdle
posed by reviewability problems, the question arises whether sub-
stantive legal rights are implicated by the involvement of adminis-
trative agencies in the criminal enforcement of federal laws. This
Article suggests that such rights are, in fact, implicated.
1. Constitutional Rights
An argument can be made that prosecution under the hypothet-
ical situation used in this Article59 would violate constitutional due
process and equal protection rights because United States Attorneys
ordinarily have not prosecuted similarly situated persons. The
Supreme Court provided support for such an argument in the 1886
case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.60 In Yick Wo, the Court reversed the con-
viction of a Chinese man accused of operating a laundry in violation
of a county ordinance because the local sheriff enforced the ordi-
nance in an unconstitutional manner by discriminating against per-
sons of Chinese descent. The Court reasoned:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution. 61
The Court reaffirmed this broad proposition in the 1979 case of
United States v. Batchelder, stating that "[s]electivity in the enforce-
ment of criminal laws ... is subject to constitutional constraints." 62
This argument, though available, is not likely to succeed.63
59 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
60 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
61 Id. at 373-74.
62 Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125 (holding that a prosecutor's selection of one statutory
penalty provision rather than another did not, under the facts of the case, violate consti-
tutional constraints). See also Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838; Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572,
577 (8th Cir. 1980)("[t]he equal protection clause is applicable not only to discrimina-
tory legislative action, but also to governmental action in the administration and en-
forcement of law"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); United States v.Johnson, 577 F.2d
1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. McDonald, 553 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (S.D.
Tex. 1983). See generally Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or En-
forcement of Laws as to Provide a Valid Defense in Federal Criminal Proceedings, 45 A.L.R. FED.
732 (1979).
63 See generally Note, The Procedural Due Process Approach to Administrative Discretion: The
Courts' Inverted Analysis, 95 YALE LJ. 1017 (1986). The constitutional arguments address
actions of the United States Attorney, rather than of the FDA. It is questionable
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Very few cases fall within the limited class of cases in which constitu-
tional deprivations are likely to be found. 64 The Supreme Court has
stated that "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforce-
ment is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." 65 To support
a due process or equal protection challenge to selective prosecu-
tion, a party must show that the prosecution either "was deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification, ' 66 or that it resulted from "the defendant's
exercise of a protected right." 67 Moreover, the challenging party
must "overcome the presumption that the prosecution was under-
taken in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner." 68
In United States v. Berrios, which is the most frequently cited case
in this area, the Second Circuit summarized the defendant's "heavy
burden" as follows:
To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a de-
whether, in and of themselves, the FDA's actions fall within the coverage of the due
-process clause. In Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), the Supreme Court refused
to extend the full panoply of due process protections to proceedings before the Com-
mission on Civil Rights, a "purely investigative agenc[y]" that the Court compared to
the FDA. Id. at 442, 444, 470 app. The Court's reasoning in Hannah could be applied to
a FDA recommendation to prosecute. The Court stated:
[T]he Commission['s] ... function is purely investigative and fact-finding. It does
not adjudicate. It does not.., indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions. It does
not make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or property. In short,
[it] does not and cannot take any affirmative action which will affect an individual's
legal rights. The only purpose of its existence is to find facts which may subse-
quently be used as a basis for legislative or executive action [including the possibil-
ity of criminal prosecutions.]
Id. at 441. See also Ewing, 339 U.S. at 598 (claimant's opportunity to challenge the FDA's
probable cause determination in the subsequent libel action for seizure "satisfies the
requirements of due process"); Georator Corp., 592 F.2d at 768 ("[w]hen only investiga-
tive powers of an agency are utilized, due process considerations do not attach").
64 See, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 344 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Va. 1972). In Fletcher,
the defendant argued that he had been "denied equal protection... because other [air
force] members.., who are taken into custody for [DWI] are carried before their Com-
manding Officer rather than charged under the statute." Id. at 338. The court held that
"[t]he mere fact that the police.., did not follow the statute in other cases would not
entitle defendant to relief. ... The police do not arrest all violators of the law, but the
fact that one escapes arrest does not entitle one properly arrested to be released." Id.
65 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)(failure to prosecute others as habitual
offenders did not deprive petitioner, convicted as a habitual offender, of equal
protection).
66 Id.
67 United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 869 (4th Cir.) (rejecting petitioner's selec-
tive prosecution argument), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979).
68 United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.)(rejecting selective
prosecution argument of protestors who were convicted of the misdemeanor offense of
being present on federal property after normal working hours), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 960
(1983). Accord United States v. Niemiec, 611 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980).
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fendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1)
that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded
against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge
against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the
government's discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been
invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible consider-
ations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of consti-
tutional rights.6 9
By applying the Berrios test or a variation thereof, it is apparent that
the vast majority of cases have rejected the equal protection or due
process arguments which are based upon allegations of selective
prosecution.
70
A heavy burden is also likely if the constitutional argument is
couched in terms of discriminatory enforcement. A defendant
would first have to show that similarly situated persons have not
been prosecuted. Because FDA prosecutions are heavily fact-spe-
cific, it may be difficult to show that similarly situated persons have
not been prosecuted. The greater obstacle, however, is showing
that the decision to prosecute was based upon unjustifiable stan-
dards such as race, religion or the exercising of federal constitu-
tional rights.71 It will be virtually impossible to satisfy this second
essential element of the discriminatory enforcement defense in the
context of a FDA criminal prosecution.
2. The Right To Consistent And Evenhanded Agency Treatment
If the FDA has not recommended prosecution of persons simi-
larly situated to a particular individual or corporation being prose-
cuted, the prosecution recommendation could be classified as
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of agency discretion. 72 It is
69 United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Hoover, 727 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1984)(rejecting air traffic
controller's discriminatory prosecution argument); United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d
1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1983)(rejecting food stamp recipient's selective prosecution argu-
ment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985); United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 221-22
(D.C. Cir. 1974)(rejecting drug offender's selective enforcement argument). Cf LeClair
v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting a dairy farmer's equal protection
challenge to a state's selective enforcement of a civil regulation), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
959 (1981); Cook v. City of Price, Carbon County, Utah, 566 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir.
1977)(rejecting an equal protection challenge to a city's selective enforcement of a civil
zoning regulation).
71 See United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972)(reversing convic-
tions that were based upon discriminatory prosecutions of persons exercising their first
amendment rights); Tolbert v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, 568 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D.
Tenn. 1983)(enjoining city from enforcing an ordinance against a topless bar because
the city enforced the ordinance in a discriminatory manner that chilled first amendment
rights).
72 Again, however, the problem of reviewability must be kept in mind. See supra notes
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firmly established that an agency's unjustified discriminatory treat-
ment of similarly situated parties constitutes arbitrary and capri-
cious agency action.7 3 This rule has been applied to the FDA in civil
actions.7 4 Although there are no criminal cases in which the rule
has been applied or discussed, it has been relied upon with regard
33-58 and accompanying text. The APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action ... is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. 702 (Supp.
III 1985). However, judicial review is available only for "final agency action," 5 U.S.C.
§ 704 (1982) and is unavailable for "agency action [that] is committed to agency discre-
tion by law," id. § 701(a)(2). The FDA and the United States Attorney would most likely
argue that a FDA decision to recommend prosecution cannot be reviewed under the
APA because (a) such a decision does not represent final agency action, or (b) such a
decision is committed by law to agency discretion. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.45(d)(2)(i)
(1986) ("[t]he [FDA] Commissioner shall object to judicial review of a matter if... [it] is
committed by law to the discretion of the Commissioner, e.g., a decision to recommend
or not to recommend civil or criminal enforcement action"). See also Chaney, 470 U.S. at
837; United States v.J. Treffiletti & Sons, 496 F. Supp. 53, 56 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)(refusing
to dismiss the misdemeanor indictments of individuals named as defendants for viola-
tions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, rejecting, inter alia, an unspecified APA
argument, and holding without legal citation that "[tihe [APA] does not apply in this
criminal prosecution based upon the return of an indictment by the Grand Jury"). Cf
Gordan, 514 F. Supp. at 662 (decision by Comptroller of the Currency as to whether to
bring criminal charges is not subject to APA review because the APA "does not author-
ize review of decisions committed by law to agency discretion").
73 See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 785 F.2d 338, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Green County Mobilephone v. FCC, 765 F.2d 235, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1985)("[w]e reverse
the Commission not because the strict rule it applied is inherently invalid, but rather
because the Commission has invoked the rule inconsistently. We find that the Commis-
sioner has not treated similar cases similarly"); McHenry v. Bond, 668 F.2d 1185, 1192-
93 (11 th Cir. 1982); Crestline Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 243, 245 (6th
Cir. 1982)(NLRB cannot "treat similar situations in dissimilar ways"(quoting Burinskas
v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. (1966))); Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883, 891
n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 649 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir.
1981); Ace Motor Freight, Inc. v. ICC, 557 F.2d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 598, 603 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1078 (1977); Contractors Transport Corp. v. United States, 537
F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1976)("[p]atently inconsistent application of agency standards
to similar situations lacks rationality" and is prohibited under the APA's arbitrary and
capricious standard); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1264 (4th Cir.
1974); Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 987 (2d Cir. 1973); Hill v.
FPC, 335 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 1964); Keen Transport, Inc. v. United States, 446 F.
Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Nat'l Alliance of Postal & Federal Employees v. Nickerson,
424 F. Supp. 323, 327 (D.D.C. 1976); Interstate Contract Carrier Corp. v. United States,
389 F. Supp. 1159, 1163 (D. Utah 1974). See also NoteJudicial Review of Reversals of Policy
by Administrative Agencies, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1251 (1955).
74 E.g., United States v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 748 F.2d 56, 62 (2d Cir.
1984)("[w]e must insist that the FDA apply its scientific conclusions evenhandedly and
that it not 'grant to one person the right to do that which it denies to another similarly
situated.' So long as the FDA allows [one manufacturer to market electric devices with-
out prior FDA approval], we have no choice but to allow [petitioner] also [to do so].
Deference to administrative discretion or expertise is not a license to a regulatory
agency to treat like cases differently.")(citation omitted).
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to agency sanctions. 75 Moreover, the essence of the rule-equality
of treatment-has been specifically endorsed by both the FDA 76 and
the Department of Justice as a desirable enforcement goal.
77
This administrative law principle is grounded in the unassaila-
ble proposition that agencies must not discriminate against similarly
situated parties, and it recognizes that "[a] fundamental ofjustice is
equality of treatment. 78 It is an eminently reasonable principle,
and a party who relies upon it is not required to overcome the over-
whelming contrary precedent that confronts a constitutional chal-
lenge to discriminatory enforcement.
7 9
3. The Accardi Doctrine And The Right To Insist Upon Agency
Compliance With Its Own Rules
The criminal prosecution of an individual who has not first
75 Compare Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 184 (2d Cir. 1976)(modifying
the sanctions imposed on a broker-dealer because of "the tremendous disparity between
the sanctions invoked.., and that imposed on two other brokers whose violations were
perhaps more clear"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), with General Securities Corp. v.
SEC, 583 F.2d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1978)(per curiam) (refusing to modify the sanctions
imposed on a broker-dealer and rejecting the argument that "the sanctions [were] out of
line with those imposed in [similar] cases;" the court held that "a sanction ... is not
rendered invalid because it varies from that applied in other cases" and that, in any
event, the petitioner's situation was "readily distinguishable" from the other cases upon
which he relied).
76 See 21 C.F.R. § 7.1 (1986)("[t]his part [Enforcement Policy] is promulgated to...
assure uniform and consistent application of practices and procedures throughout the
agency").
77 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION i (1980)(these Princi-
ples are intended to "promote the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial authority, and
contribute to the fair, evenhanded administration of the federal criminal laws"); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUsTICE, UNrrED STATES ArrORNEYS' MANUAL § 7-5.126 (1981)("[a]n affirma-
tive obligation to coordinate all [criminal FDA) actions exists among the [FDA], the
United States Attorney and the Consumer Affairs Section in order to facilitate consistent
treatment of cases across the country").
78 Jones v. Califano, 576 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir. 1978).
79 See supra note 73. See also Marriott In-Flite Services Division of Marriott Corp. v.
NLRB, 417 F.2d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 1969)("[t]he Board... allowed employees certain
rights in one geographic area, and different, more extensive rights in all other geo-
graphic areas without offering any justification for the disparate treatment. ... If the
agency establishes a general policy then departs from it, judicial approval of the depar-
ture will be withheld in the absence of an explanation"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970);
Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cir. 1964)(Brown, J., concur-
ring)(refusing to enforce an FTC cease and desist order because of the FTC's departure
from earlier pronouncements on the legality of the challenged advertising practice,
"[the] law does not permit an agency to grant to one person the right to do that which it
denies to another similarly situated. There may not be a rule for Monday, another for
Tuesday, a rule for general application, but denied outright in a specific case"), rev'd on
other grounds, 382 U.S. 46 (1965). But see Barnum v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Board, 595 F.2d
869, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(rejecting petitioner's argument that his 150-day suspension
was "not in accord with Board policy and precedent").
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been given notice and an opportunity to remedy an alleged FDA
violation would appear to be a violation of the Accardi doctrine. This
doctrine was summarized in a recent district court decision:
[W]hen the rights of an individual are affected, an agency must follow
its own procedure, even where the intended procedures are more rig-
orous than otherwise would be required. Should an agency in its pro-
ceedings violate its rules and prejudice results, the proceedings are
tainted and any action resulting from the proceedings cannot stand.80
In Accardi v. Shaughnessy, the Court reversed a discretionary de-
cision by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("the Board") to deny a
petitioner's application for suspension of deportation because the
Board failed to follow its procedural regulations for "processing
[such] an... application.' ' a l The Board was appointed by the Attor-
ney General and was subject to his overview, but the relevant regu-
lations specifically required the Board "to exercise its own judgment
when considering appeals." 82 The Board failed to do so with peti-
tioner's appeal because the Attorney General had, in effect, dictated
the Board's decision. Under the regulations, the Attorney General
was not supposed to act unless certain things happened first, includ-
ing the exercise of independent judgment by the Board. Although
such predicate acts did not occur, the Attorney General acted any-
way, contrary to the regulations. This action would be analogous to
either the FDA recommending prosecution of an individual in a rou-
tine case or the United States Attorney prosecuting that individual
even though the prefatory requirements established by the FDA's
prior-warning policy had not been met. To this extent, and to the
extent that the challenged agency action was discretionary, Accardi
provides direct support for the conclusion that the FDA cannot rec-
ommend prosecution of an individual who has not been given a
prior warning in compliance with the FDA's policy.
The doctrine which resulted from the Accardi decision is based
upon both administrative law and due process principles, although
its precise legal foundation is unclear. 83 The doctrine has basically
80 Borowski v. Heckler, 581 F. Supp. 549, 552 (N.D. Ind. 1984)(citation omitted). See
also VanderMolen v. Stetson, 571 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1977)("It is ... a fundamental
tenet of our legal system that the Government must follow its own regulations. Actions
by an agency of the executive branch in violation of its own regulations are illegal and
void.").
81 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954). Earlier decisions of the Court also support the Accardi
doctrine. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945)("The rules afford protec-
tion at th[e] crucial stage of the proceedings or not at all. .... '[O]ne under investigation
with a view to deportation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules
promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to law' "(citation omitted)).
82 Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266.
83 Compare Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
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three essential elements. First, there must be an agency rule, regu-
lation, policy or procedure that governs a particular subject. It does
not apply to isolated, ad hoc or informal agency positions on such a
subject.8 4 Second, the rule, regulation, policy or procedure must
actually affect the rights of individuals, rather than being "a mere
housekeeping provision. ' '8 5  Third, an individual must be
prejudiced because of an agency's failure to follow the rule, regula-
tion, policy or procedure.8 6 The FDA, like other federal agencies, is
92 n.8 (1978)(dictum)(Accardi "enunciate[s] principles of federal administrative law
rather than of constitutional law binding upon the States") and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359
U.S. 535, 547 (1959)(FrankfurterJ., concurring) (Accardi doctrine is a "judicially evolved
rule of administrative law") with United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754
(1979)("[a]gency violations of their own regulations, whether or not also in violation of
the Constitution, may well be inconsistent with the standards of agency action which the
APA directs the courts to enforce") and id. at 758 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing)("Although not always predicated on the Due Process Clause, [the Accardi doctrine
is] explicable in no other terms .... [It] cannot be dismissed as federal administrative
law"). See also Simmons v. Block, 782 F.2d 1545, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1986)(Accardi doc-
trine applied as a rule of administrative law);Jones v. Board of Governors of the Univer-
sity of North Carolina, 704 F.2d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 1983)("significant departures from
stated procedures of government ... if sufficiently unfair and prejudicial, constitute
procedural due process violations"); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th
Cir. 1969)(Accardi decision based upon "a violation of due process"); Doe v. General
Services Admin., 544 F. Supp. 530, 537, 542 (D. Md. 1982)(Accardi doctrine described in
the court's opinion as a "principle[] of administrative law," but in the court's resulting
order as a matter of "due process rights under the Fifth Amendment").
84 Cf. Edison Pharmaceutical Co. v. FDA, 600 F.2d 831, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(re-
jecting manufacturer's argument that "allegedly different treatment rendered by the
FDA to [a different] drug" required the FDA to treat the manufacturer's drug in the
similar manner).
85 United States v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
In Howard, the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that petitioner's conviction should
be reversed because the government failed to follow "the dual prosecution guidelines
formulated by the Department of Justice" for dealing with federal cases that have al-
ready been subjected to state prosecution (the so-called "Petite" policy). Id. at 567. The
court held that the Petite policy is "a mere housekeeping provision" and held it inappli-
cable to a case in which the government failed to comply with a "regulation having force
of law" and affecting individual rights. Id. at 567-68 (citation omitted). Accord United
States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.)("a violation of the internal housekeeping
rules of the Department of'Justice doe not entitle Snell to dismissal of the indictment"),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979). See generally Annotation, Effect on Federal Ciminal Prosecu-
lion or Conviction of Prosecutor's Noncompliance with Petite Policy: Requiring Prior Authorization
of Attorney Generalfor Federal Trial Where Accused Has Been Previously Prosecutedfor Same Acts in
State Court, 51 A.L.R. FED. 852 (1981).
86 See supra note 15. See generally Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppek When Agencies
Break Their Own "Laws, "64 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1985); Smolla, The Erosion of the Principle that
the Government Must Follow Self-Imposed Rules, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 472 (1984); Note, Viola-
tions byAgencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARv. L. REv. 629 (1974). Clearly, there is a
relationship between the requirements of the Accardi doctrine and the requirement that
agencies treat similarly situated parties in a consistent manner. The relationship arises
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subject to the doctrine's requirements.8 7
The argument advanced here is that, contrary to the Accardi
doctrine, a FDA recommendation of prosecution would constitute a
violation of the agency's stated policy of not prosecuting individuals
in routine cases if the individuals have not had prior warning of the
violations and an opportunity to remedy them.88 Such an argument
is supported by the numerous cases in which the Accardi doctrine
has been applied to invalidate agency actions.89
when the dissimilar treatment results from the agency's departure from an express rule
or policy.
87 E.g., Southeastern Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758, 766 (5th Cir. 1980)("the
statement of policy [in the FDA's Compliance Policy Guide] represents the FDA's formal
position ... and obligates the agency to act in a manner consistent with that policy until
it is amended or revoked"); Heterochemical Corp., 644 F. Supp. at 276. Cf. Triangle Candy
Co., 144 F.2d at 198 (reversing criminal convictions of various corporate and individual
defendants because the FDA failed to comply with applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements, which "grant[ed] ... rights to the private citizens affected," rather than
protect "the government by guidance of its officials"). But see United States v. Articles of
Drug Promise Toothpaste for Sensitive Teeth, 594 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(re-
jecting argument that a FDA Compliance Policy Guide barred the FDA's action to enjoin
defendant from marketing its product but failing to discuss or even refering to the Ac-
cardi doctrine or any Accardi-doctrine cases).
88 A similar argument was made and rejected in Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d
527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969). In Spillman, the defendant was convicted
of mailing obscene materials. He argued that he should not have been convicted be-
cause a "memorandum letter circulated by the Department of Justice to the United
States Attorneys ... unofficially promulgated a policy of non-prosecution of offenders
within a class within which [he fell]." Id. at 529. Without discussing the Accardi doctrine,
the court rejected the argument.
This court cannot inquire into the motives of the United States Attorney for prose-
cuting this appellant. The United States Attorney must be given wide latitude in
order to effectively enforce the federal criminal laws. The policy which the appel-
lant complains of is wholly voluntary in nature and is not founded on case law which
would require this court to implement such a policy.
Id. at 530. This case is incorrect to the extent that it suggests that an agency must com-
ply with its policies only if they are required by case law. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199, 235 (1974)("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon
agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures
are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required."). But see Caceres, 440 U.S.
at 749 ("A court's duty to enforce an agency regulation is most evident when compliance
with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal law."). Moreover, there
are cases which support the position that a policy of non-prosecution binds the govern-
ment. E.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 1973)(vacating a convic-
tion on selective prosecution grounds because defendant was prosecuted for exercising
his first amendment rights, but also relying upon the government's failure to follow "its
policy of non-prosecution" of certain individuals for failing to carry their draft cards; "it
was incumbent upon the government ... to explain why Falk was ... singled out for
prosecution in contravention of the government's own procedures"); Busche v. Burkee,
649 F.2d 509, 517 n.10 (7th Cir.) (dictum)(citing Falk for the proposition that courts can
invalidate a decision to prosecute where there is a "governmental policy of non-prosecu-
tion"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
89 See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.
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In Service v. Dulles,90 for instance, the Court invalidated peti-
tioner's discharge from the Foreign Service because the Secretary of
State violated State Department's regulations. The Court agreed
with petitioner's claim that "regulations validly prescribed by a gov-
ernment administrator are binding upon [the administrator] as well
as the citizen, and that this principle holds even when the adminis-
trative action under review is discretionary in nature."9 1
Similarly, in Vitarelli v. Seaton,9 2 the Court reinstated a Depart-
ment of the Interior employee who had been dismissed in a manner
that failed "to conform to the procedural standards" set forth in
rules promulgated in a departmental order by the Secretary of the
Interior.93 The Court held that, "as in Service [v. Dulles], [the Secre-
tary] was bound by the regulations . . .even though without such
regulations he could have discharged petitioner summarily." 94 The
Court emphasized that "in proceedings of this nature," which lack
the usual protections of "a cause being tried in a court of law before
trained judges, scrupulous observance of departmental procedural
safeguards is clearly of particular importance." 95
Accardi, Service v. Dulles, and Vitarelli all involved application of
the Accardi doctrine to civil agency action. In Yellin v. United States,96
on the other hand, the Court applied the doctrine to reverse a con-
viction for criminal contempt. In Yellin, the House Committee on
Un-American Activities was found to have "failed to exercise its dis-
cretion" according to guidelines set forth in one of its operating
rules. 97 As a result, Yellin refused to answer certain questions, and
he was convicted of contempt. Rejecting the argument that the rule
1986); International House v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1982); Bills v. Hender-
son, 631 F.2d 1287, 1299 (6th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co.,
443 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1971)("When administrative bodies promulgate rules or regu-
lations to serve as guidelines, these guidelines should be followed. Failure to follow
such guidelines tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice contrary
to fundamental concepts of fair play and due process."); Hupart v. Board of Higher
Educ. of the City of New York, 420 F. Supp. 1087, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(Board obli-
gated to comply with "an 'unwritten,' but unequivocal," policy. "The sweep of the doc-
trine is broad. Its applicability does not turn upon the formality of the embodiment of
the pertinent policy."); see also infra note 123.
90 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
91 Id. at 372.
92 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
93 Id. at 539.
94 Id. at 540.
95 Id. Because the FDA's pre-indictment proceedings lack the usual protections af-
forded in courts of law, the FDA likewise should be held to a standard of "scrupulous
observance of [agency] procedural safeguards." Id.
96 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
97 Id. at 120.
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..was written to provide guidance for the Committee alone and...
not.., to confer [any rights] upon witnesses," 98 the Court reversed
Yellin's conviction and concluded that "[i]t is not too exacting to
require that the Committee be [as] meticulous in obeying its own
rules" as it was in "prepar[ing] the groundwork for prosecution in
Yellin's case. . ...99
In Morton v. Ruiz, 00 the Court confirmed that an agency's obli-
gation to adhere to its own rules is not limited to rules set forth in
formal regulations. The Morton Court reversed the Secretary of In-
terior's denial of general assistance benefits because, inter alia, the
agency had failed to comply with the procedures set forth in its
"manual," which was "an internal-operations brochure intended to
cover policies that 'do not relate to the public.' "101 The Court rea-
soned that
[w]here the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon
agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the
internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would
be required .... Before the [agency] may extinguish the entitlement
of these otherwise eligible beneficiaries, it must comply, at a minimum,
with its own internal procedures. 10 2
Morton thus refutes the position that the FDA's prior-warning rule
does not bind the agency because the relevant rule is not set forth in
a formal regulation.' 03
In United States v. Nixon, 104 the Court again applied the Accardi
doctrine in a criminal context. In rejecting President Nixon's re-
fusal to respond to a subpoena duces tecum, the Court noted that
the Attorney General had enacted a regulation giving the Special
Prosecutor wide latitude in seeking relevant evidence. The Court
held that the Attorney General must adhere to that regulation:
Here, as in Accardi, it is theoretically possible for the Attorney General
to amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's
authority. But he has not done so. So long as this regulation remains
98 Id. at 115.
99 Id. at 124. Yellin refuted an argument that an individual could not challenge prose-
cution based upon the FDA's prior-warning policy unless he knew about and relied upon
that policy in advance. "It was not until [Yellin's] trial ... that it became apparent the
Committee was violating its rules." Id. at 123. The Court nevertheless accepted Yellin's
argument and reversed his conviction. "Yellin should be permitted the same opportu-
nity for judicial review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been violated ...
[His] reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports to do,
adhere to its own rules." Id. But see infra note 112.
100 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
101 Id. at 235.
102 Id. (citations omitted).
103 But see infra note 117.
104 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United
States as the sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to
respect and to enforce it.1° 5
Three fairly recent Supreme Court decisions arguably signal a
partial retreat from the broad sweep given to the Accardi doctrine in
the above cases. 106 In the 1979 case of United States v. Caceres, the
Court held that taped conversations recorded by the IRS were ad-
missible in a defendant's criminal prosecution even though obtained
in violation of agency regulations.10 7 The Court reaffirmed the vi-
tality of the Accardi doctrine,10 8 but it was unwilling to apply it at the
expense of relevant evidence in a criminal prosecution. 109 The deci-
sion no doubt resulted in large measure from the Court's displea-
sure with and disinclination to extend the exclusionary rule. 110
Furthermore, the IRS had "provided for internal sanctions in cases
of knowing violations of the ... regulations."11 The FDA has no
such violation. Nonetheless, Caceres adds new dimensions to the Ac-
cardi doctrine which would certainly be relied upon by the FDA and
the United States Attorney's Office if the Accardi argument consid-
ered above were to be made."1
2
105 Id. at 696 (citation omitted).
106 The Supreme Court has, however, cited the Accardi doctrine with approval in at
least one recent case. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 622 n.18 (1985)(Marshall, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall cited the doctrine as one of "numerous doctrines" which
are "inform[ed] by the norm of regularity in governmental conduct." Id. (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall relied upon the doctrine to support the proposition that,
"while the State can define the rules of punishment initially, choosing probation or im-
prisonment, the State cannot change the rules in the middle of the game." Id. at 621-22
(Marshall, J., concurring).
107 440 U.S. 741 (1979). Cf Heffner, 420 F.2d at 813 (reversing a conviction that was
based, in part, upon a statement obtained from a taxpayer by an IRS agent who failed to
warn the taxpayer of the possibility of criminal prosecution, as required by an agency
rule). See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
108 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 751 n.14.
109 Justice Marshall filed a lengthy dissent criticizing the majority's departure from the
Court's past insistence that agencies comply with "internal regulations [that] do not
merely facilitate internal agency housekeeping, but rather afford significant procedural
protections." Id. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(joined by Brennan, J.).
10 See id. at 754.
111 Id. at 756.
112 Particularly troubling are the Court's suggestion that the Accardi doctrine is some-
how less applicable when "the agency was not required by the Constitution or by statute
to adopt [the] procedures or rules" that the agency has failed to follow, id. at 749, and
the Court's apparent introduction of a party's subjective reliance on the relevant regula-
tion into the Accardi doctrine, id. at 752-53. As the dissent points out, these aspects of
the opinion are totally foreign to, and inconsistent with, the Court's prior decisions.
E.g., Morton, 415 U.S. at 235 ("it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own proce-
dures . . .even where [they] are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be re-
quired"); Yellin, 374 U.S. at 123 (reversing a criminal contempt conviction because of
non-compliance with a committee rule even though the convicted party did not know
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The Court's 1981 decision in Schweiker v. Hansen"t3 is also
troubling. The Hansen Court held that the government was not es-
topped from denying petitioner retroactive benefits because a "field
representative" of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") failed
to comply with the instructions of an internal SSA handbook when
interviewing the petitioner. 1 4 With the exception of Caceres, the
Court failed to cite or discuss any of its Accardi cases. The facts of
Hansen are plainly distinguishable from the hypothetical facts used
in this Article, and the Court emphasized in Hansen the inappropri-
ateness of estopping the government because of the negligence of a
lower-level agent, especially when such estoppel would adversely af-
fect the public treasury. 115 Nevertheless, the Court's refusal to at-
tach significance to the agency's failure to follow its procedural rules
supports a challenge to a party's reliance upon a policy statement
contained in a FDA staff manual:
[T]here is no doubt that [the field representative] failed to follow the
Claims Manual .... But the Claims Manual is not a regulation. It has
no legal force, and it does not bind the SSA. Rather it is a 13-volume
handbook for internal use by thousands of SSA employees .... If
[the] minor breach of such a manual suffices to estop [the Govern-
ment], then the Government is put "at risk that every alleged failure
by an agent to follow instructions to the last detail in one of a thou-
sand cases will deprive it of the benefit of [other requirements] which
experience has taught to be essential to the honest and effective ad-
ministration of the Social Security Laws."
116
about the rule until trial and thus could not have relied upon it). See supra notes 96-103
and accompanying text. Caceres appears to be a result-oriented decision in which the
majority conveniently, but inappropriately, disregarded numerous aspects of its Accardi
precedent.
t11 450 U.S. 785 (1981)(per curiam).
114 Caceres, 450 U.S. at 786, 790.
115 Like Caceres, Hansen appears to be a result-oriented decision.
116 Caceres, 450 U.S. at 789-90 (citations omitted). The Court's distinction between
policy statements in an agency manual and policy statements set forth in regulations is
inconsistent with past holdings. See, e.g., Morton, 415 U.S. 199. Additionally, this Article
argues that it is an inappropriate distinction to draw in most cases. A similar distinction
was recently applied in Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir.
1986)(opinion by Scalia, J.). In Brock, the court, in an opinion by then Circuit Judge
Scalia, held that the Department of Labor's "Enforcement Policy and Guidelines for
Independent Contractors," regarding the enforcement of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982), were not legally binding even though
they had been published in the Federal Register. The court stated that, although "an
agency must adhere to its own regulations," an agency "need not adhere to mere 'gen-
eral statement[s] of policy.' " Id. at 536 (citations omitted). The Brock court held that
there was "no basis for overturning the Secretary's judgment that his independent con-
tractor enforcement guidelines do not constitute a binding, substantive regulation," be-
cause the guidelines were "replete with indications that the Secretary retained his
discretion to cite production-operators as he saw fit." Id. at 538. The problem with the
court's reasoning is that it largely defeats a central purpose of publishing guidelines: to
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Additionally, the Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney 1 7 argua-
bly counters the view that a FDA failure to comply with its prior-
warning policy would violate the Accardi doctrine and invalidate any
subsequent criminal prosecution. As noted earlier, the Court held
in Chaney that a decision by the FDA not to initiate enforcement ac-
tions is unreviewable under the APA because it constitutes "agency
action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law."'" 8 The Cha-
ney Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, which had held that the FDA's inaction
was reviewable, arbitrary and capricious." 9 The D.C. Circuit had
based its decision principally upon the "strong presumption" of re-
viewability 20 and upon Supreme Court precedent to the effect that
a matter is committed by law to agency discretion only "in those
rare instances where the governing statute is 'drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' "121 Signifi-
candy, the court of appeals held that there was "law to apply" in the
form of a FDA policy statement which "made law to govern and
guide [the FDA's] discretion in regulating the unapproved use of
approved drugs."' 22 The court cited the Accardi doctrine in a foot-
note as partial support for its conclusion that the FDA's policy state-
ment was a binding agency "rule."' 23 This rule, the circuit court
concluded, provided part of the law that was available for the court
to apply and subjected the FDA's inaction to judicial review.1 24
ensure evenhandedness and consistency when agency officials exercise discretionary au-
thority. The Brock court's holding essentially guarantees unlimited discretion to the De-
partment of Labor in enforcing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act. The result is
inappropriate in a legal system that prides itself on achieving fairness and justice
through various checks and balances. Moreover, the holding is inconsistent with many
of the D.C. Circuit's earlier decisions. E.g., Massachusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration, 758 F.2d 708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Massachusetts
Fair Share, the court stated that the "settled" precept that "a federal agency must ad-
here firmly to self-adopted rules by which the interests of others are to be regulated ...
is rooted in the concept of fair play and in abhorrence of unjust discrimination, and its
ambit is not limited to rules attaining the status of formal regulations." Id. Courts have
applied this precept to statements in a "personnel manual," an "agency's 'usual prac-
tice,' " regulations "set forth in agency weekly bulletin," and "instructions ... reported
in agency news release." Id. It is interesting to note that then CircuitJudge Scalia dis-
sented from the court in Massachusetts Fair Share, while writing the opinion for the
court in Brock.
117 Chaney, 470 U.S. 821.
118 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
119 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
120 Id. at 1183-84.
121 Id. at 1184 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971)).
122 Id. at 1186.
123 Id. at 1186 n.31.
124 Id.
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In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court failed to
address the applicability of the Accardi doctrine to the FDA's policy
statement. The Court, however, did summarily reject the signifi-
cance of the policy statement for reviewability purposes, in stating:
We . . . find singularly unhelpful the agency "policy statement" on
which the Court of Appeals placed great reliance. We would have dif-
ficulty with this statement's vague language even if it were a properly
adopted agency rule. Although the statement indicates that the
agency considered itself "obligated" to take certain investigative ac-
tions, that language did not arise in the course of discussing the
agency's discretion to exercise its enforcement power, but rather in
the context of describing agency policy with respect to unapproved
uses of approved drugs by physicians. In addition, if read to circum-
scribe agency enforcement discretion, the statement conflicts with the
agency rule on judicial review, 21 C.F.R. § 10.45(d)(2) (1984), which
states that "It]he Commissioner shall object to judicial review ... if (i)
[t]he matter is committed by law to the discretion of the Commis-
sioner, e.g., a decision to recommend or not to recommend civil or
criminal enforcement action .... " But in any event the policy state-
ment was attached to a rule that was never adopted. Whatever force
such a statement might have, and leaving to one side the problem of
whether an agency's rules might under certain circumstances provide
courts with adequate guidelines for informed judicial review of deci-
sions not to enforce, we do not think the language of the agency's
"policy statement" can plausibly be read to override the agency's ex-
press assertion of unreviewable discretion contained in the above
rule. 125
The Court's ambiguous language with respect to the agency's
policy statement clearly runs counter to the position that the FDA's
prior-warning policy binds the agency and must be complied with in
routine cases if a criminal prosecution is to stand. The Court's ac-
tual holding, however, was limited to a finding that the policy state-
ment at issue was inapposite and did not provide "law" for the
district court to apply in evaluating the FDA's discretionary decision
not to initiate enforcement actions. Therefore, Chaney does not-
and should not-prevent lower courts from requiring the FDA to
comply with its prior-warning policy in routine cases.
In this regard, one lower court decision also merits discussion.
In United States v. Heffner,126 the leading Accardi case in the Fourth
Circuit, an agency had recommended a case to a United States At-
torney for criminal prosecution, although the agency had failed to
follow internal instructions which required the agency to give prior
warnings to the regulated party. The defendant in Heffner was con-
125 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 836.
126 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969).
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victed of criminal tax fraud based, in part, upon statements that he
gave to an IRS special agent. Contrary to internal instructions, this
agent failed to warn the taxpayer that the agent's function was "to
investigate the possibility of a criminal prosecution" and that the
taxpayer could obtain counsel before talking to the agent. 127 The
relevant instructions were contained in an IRS "News Release" and
were intended to "insure uniformity in protecting the Constitutional
rights of all persons."'128 Applying the Accardi doctrine, the court
held that it was reversible error to admit into evidence statements
obtained in violation of internal procedures. The court stated:
An agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regula-
tions, or procedures which it has established. When it fails to do so, its
action cannot stand and courts will strike it down.... It is of no signif-
icance that the procedures or instructions which the IRS has estab-
lished are more generous than the Constitution requires .... Nor
does it matter that these IRS instructions to Special Agents were not
promulgated in something formally labeled a "Regulation" or
adopted with strict regard to the [APA]; the Accardi doctrine has a
broader sweep. ... [This strict adherence is] consistent with the doc-
trine's purpose to prevent the arbitrariness which is inherently charac-
teristic of an agency's violation of its own procedures. . . . The
arbitrary character of such a departure is in no way ameliorated by the
fact that the required procedure was enunciated as an instruction in a
"News Release."' 1
29
The Heffner court reversed the taxpayer's conviction and remanded
for further proceedings. It suggested, however, that because the
taxpayer had already served most of his sentence, "this may be a
case in which the government concludes to dismiss the indict-
ment."'130 This aspect of the opinion supports the position that a
FDA violation of the Accardi doctrine could warrant dismissal of a
127 Id. at 811 (citation omitted).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 812 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (lst Cir.
1970), in which the court suppressed statements obtained by the IRS from a taxpayer
because of the agent's failure to comply with the prior-warning instructions involved in
Heffner.
130 Heffner, 420 F.2d at 813. The Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Caceres, supra
notes 107-16 and accompanying text, clearly undermines Leahey, supra note 129, and, to
a lesser extent, Heffner, see supra notes 126-29 an accompanying text. The Court held in
Caceres that taped conversations were admissible even though obtained by the IRS in
violation of agency regulations. The regulations at issue in Caceres, however, were differ-
ent from those involved in Heffner and Leahey, and the Caceres Court expressly reaffirmed
the vitality of Accardi doctrine. The majority opinion in Caceres did not mention Heffner or
Leahey. But see Caceres, 440 U.S. at 758 n. 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citing both Heffner
and Leahey as correctly noting the "due process foundations" of the Accardi doctrine).
Nevertheless, the FDA and the United States Attorneys probably would argue that Hef
ner is no longer good law in light of Caceres. See Groder, supra note 131; United States v.
Irvine, 699 F.2d 43, 46 (Ist Cir. 1983).
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subsequent indictment by the United States Attorney.13 '
IV. SUMMARY
This Article has highlighted the important, but often over-
looked, role that administrative agencies play in the criminal en-
forcement of federal statutes. Substantial legal issues are raised,
and rights implicated, by the exercise of discretion by administrative
agencies, particularly when an abuse of that discretion could result
in criminal penalties. Courts should vigorously guard against
agency abuses of discretion in referring cases for criminal prosecu-
tion. Under the hypothetical situation used in this Article, a court
should dismiss an attempted criminal prosecution of a routine FDA
violation if the FDA failed to comply with its prior-warning policy.
Such a prosecution would be inconsistent with the Accardi doctrine
131 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Hefner must be considered in light of Groder v.
United States, which affirmed a district court's denial of a motion to squash certain IRS
summonses. In Groder, the appellant had argued that "the IRS violated [his] due process
rights by failing to follow its own administrative procedures [contained in the IRS Man-
ual] governing referral of a taxpayers case for [criminal] fraud investigation." Groder,
No. 86-2054, slip op. at 2. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument. Relying princi-
pally on Caceres, the court "distinguish[ed] internal rules of agency procedure from regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to statutory directive for a taxpayers benefit." Id. at 6.
The court suggested, in dictum, that "the judmental nature of the referral decision
[should not be transformed] into one with general a priori rules and conditions.... Id. at
10. The court failed to cite Accardi, Hefner or any of its other Accardi decisions, however,
and its opinion in Groder may be one which should be limited to its particular facts. This
Article asserts that courts must apply the Accardi doctrine rigorously, erring perhaps on
the side of its application, to ensure that agencies refer criminal cases rationally and
evenhandedly. With the arguable exception of Grader, the Fourth Circuit has consist-
ently applied the Accardi doctrine in that manner. See, e.g., Jones v. Board of Governors
of the University of North Carolina, 704 F.2d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 1983); Morris v. McCad-
din, 553 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1977)(invalidating a reduction in force by the Army
National Guard that was not accomplished in accordance with "general guidance" that
was provided in a pamphlet distributed to various Adjutant Generals at a meeting in
Washington, D.C.); Elec. Components Corp. of North Carolina v. NLRB, 546 F.2d 1088,
1090 (4th Cir. 1976); McCourt v. Hampton, 514 F.2d 1365, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975)(invali-
dating an Army transfer and demotion that did not comply with an "internal regulation"
contained in the Federal Personnel Manual. "This court has been and will be as assidu-
ous in requiring the government to live up to regulations for the conduct of its own
affairs when noncompliance results in prejudice to an adverse party, as it has and will
continue to be in requiring a private citizen to regulate and conduct himself in accord-
ance with federal law" (citation omitted)); Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1217-
18 n.8 (4th Cir. 1975)(en banc)(holding that a district court has jurisdiction to review
the severity of administrative sanctions and noting that instructions contained in a mem-
orandum to regional and field offices addressed the question of sanctions; "excessive
variance, something more striking than 'mere unevenness,' would be evidence of arbi-
trary or capricious action, because ... it may well be concluded that the Secretary [of
Agriculture] failed to observe his own regulations and therefore the sanction was unwar-
ranted in law"); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700, 706 (4th Cir.
1969).
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and its underlying due process and administrative law principles and
would constitute dissimilar treatment of similarly situated parties in
violation of the prohibition against arbitrary and capricious agency
action. Moreover, prosecution under such facts could rise to the
level of discriminatory and selective enforcement by the FDA in vio-
lation of the due process and equal protection requirements.
The legal rights of potential defendants will necessarily be
colored in a given case by the severity of the alleged FDA violation,
and reviewability problems will certainly arise. Nevertheless, corpo-
rate and individual defendants may be able to advance legal argu-
ments for non-prosecution based upon the FDA's involvement in
the criminal prosecution. These legal arguments are available when
the FDA (or any agency, for that matter) has failed to treat similarly
situated parties in a consistent manner, or when it has failed to com-
ply with an 'agency policy or rule whose application is intended to
protect the rights of individuals subject to possible criminal prose-
cution. As the Supreme Court stated in Yellin, "[i]t is not too exact-
ing to require that [a federal agency] be [as] meticulous in obeying
its own rules [as it is in] prepar[ing] the groundwork for prosecution
in [each] case." 13 2 It is essential that courts recognize the potential
for agency abuse of discretion in the context of the criminal enforce-
ment of federal statutes, and that they hold agencies strictly to the
requirements of consistent treatment and compliance with the agen-
cies' own rules. /
132 Yellin, 374 U.S. at 124.
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